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Abstract
Like all of quantum information theory, quantum cryptography is tradi-
tionally based on two level quantum systems. In this letter, a new protocol for
quantum key distribution based on higher dimensional systems is presented.
An experimental realization using an interferometric setup is also proposed.
Analyzing this protocol from the practical side, one finds an increased key
creation rate while keeping the initial laser pulse rate constant. Analyzing
it for the case of intercept/resend eavesdropping strategy, an increased error
rate is found compared to two dimensional systems, hence an advantage for
the legitimate users to detect an eavesdropper.
1 Introduction
Reliable transfer of confidential information is becoming more and more
important. The only means, mathematically proven to be secure, is the
One Time Pad [1], in which the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob,
need to share a common secret key. This key is used to en- and de-
code the secret message. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is known to
complement the One Time Pad to a secure system [2]. Based on the
non-classical features of quantum mechanics, it provides the distribution
of the key in a way, that guarantees the detection of any eavesdropping.
Roughly speaking, since it is not possible to measure an unknown quan-
tum system without modifying it, an eavesdropper manifests itself by
introducing errors in the transmission data. After the final transmis-
sion, a suitable subset of data is used to estimate the error rate. If the
error rate is found to be below a certain threshold, Alice and Bob can
proceed using the remaining data to establish a secret key by means of
error correction and privacy amplification [3]. Otherwise they will decide
that the data are not secure and start a new data transmission.
During the last years several quantum key distribution protocols
based on two-level systems (qubits) have been published [4, 5]. The
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connection between the quantum bit error rate QBER and the maximum
amount of information the eavesdropper might have attained has been
investigated both in the case of incoherent and coherent (joint measure-
ment of more qubits) eavesdropping attacks [5, 6], and the shortening of
the raw key due to error correction and privacy amplification has been
calculated [7]. There is one interesting thing to note: all work, not only
in the case of quantum key distribution but in quantum information the-
ory in generally, has this far mainly been based on qubits (for exceptions,
see e.g. [8]). The reason is probably easy but not very scientific: classical
information theory is based on bits. Indeed, the enlargement to higher
alphabets is of no interest in the classical case since it does not hold any
advantage.
From the experimental side, a number of prototypes, based on qubits,
have been developed, demonstrating that QKD not only works inside
the laboratory, but outside - under real conditions - as well [9]. Thus
quantum key distribution together with the One Time Pad, could already
today provide an alternative to the traditional public key systems where
security is based on computational complexity, which may turn out to be
insecure. However, using present technology, the prototypes, especially
those, adapted to ”long” transmission distances of tens of kilometers,
still suffer from low key creation rates of some hundred Hz. This could
be improved by a factor of ten by sending single photon Fock states
instead of faint laser pulses (containing only 0.1 photon per pulse), and
by increasing the initial pulse rate, however, the drawback being more
and more severe technical demands.
In this article, we propose a new QKD protocol using a larger al-
phabet and analyze it in terms of key creation rate and security against
eavesdropping. Surprisingly and in opposition to the classical treatment
of information, we find some important differences when passing from
the two- to the higher dimensional case. Since each photon carries more
information, we find an increase of the flux of information between Alice
and Bob while keeping the initial pulse rate constant. Beyond and even
more important, a first eavesdropping analysis considering the strategy
of intercept/resend shows advantages of this new protocol with respect
to protocols based on qubits.
The paper is arranged in the following way: In section 2, we intro-
duce our new proposal and investigate it in terms of security against
eavesdropping. After this theoretical part, we present an experimental
realization (section 3) and discuss some further extensions of our idea
(section 4). Finally, a short conclusion is given in section 5.
2
2 Quantum key distribution using larger
alphabets
Higher-dimensional quantum systems have already been investigated in
order to generalize tests of local realism or in the context of the Kochen
Specker theorem ([10, 11] and references therein). However, up to now,
like its classical counterpart, quantum information theory has essentially
been based on bits (qubits).
Here we investigate the use of higher spins for QKD. One can imagine
a whole variety of new protocols. For example using n non-orthogonal
states, where n is the dimension of the space. However the state iden-
tification becomes more and more difficult since it has to be done with
POVM-measurements [12]. Another possibility is usingm different bases,
each with n orthogonal states, where n is the dimension of the space. In
this first approach we will limit ourselves to a protocol, using two bases
and four orthogonal states per basis.
2.1 QKD : BB84 in four-dimensions
The protocol known as the BB84, is originally intended for two bases,
each one with two orthogonal states (qubits), but it may without diffi-
culty be extended to a four-level system or the so called quantum quarts
(qu-quarts). As in the qubit case, Alice first chooses in which of two
bases she wants to prepare her state, and second she has to decide which
state to send. In the qu-quart case Alice has to chose between four dif-
ferent states, whereas in the qubit case she has to chose between two
different states. Each of the two bases are chosen with equal probability,
and each state is again chosen with equal probability. In other words, in
the four-dimensional case, each of the possible eight states appear with
probability 1/8, whereas, in the traditional two-dimensional case, the
probability is 1/4.
The first basis can always be chosen arbitrarily as
|ψα 〉, |ψβ 〉, |ψγ 〉, |ψδ 〉, (1)
where the states satisfy |〈ψi |ψj 〉| = δij The second basis has to ful-
fill a certain requirement with respect to the first basis, namely that
|〈ψi | φj 〉| = 1/2. This requirement makes the protocol symmetric which
insures that the eavesdropper is not given any advantage. There are
several choice of bases which may fulfill this requirement, but in the
following the basis is assumed to be
| φα 〉 =
1
2
( |ψα 〉+ |ψβ 〉+ |ψγ 〉+ |ψδ 〉 )
| φβ 〉 =
1
2
( |ψα 〉 − |ψβ 〉+ |ψγ 〉 − |ψδ 〉 )
| φγ 〉 =
1
2
( |ψα 〉 − |ψβ 〉 − |ψγ 〉+ |ψδ 〉 )
| φδ 〉 =
1
2
( |ψα 〉+ |ψβ 〉 − |ψγ 〉 − |ψδ 〉 ) .
(2)
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These states satisfy |〈 φi | φj 〉| = δij. Furthermore the overlap between
any state from the first (ψ-) basis with any state from the second (φ-)
basis is seen to be 1
2
as required.
Bob will every time he receives a state chose to measure either in the
ψ- or the φ- basis. At the end of all the transmissions Alice and Bob
will — as in the qubit case — have a public discussion where they single
out the transmission where they have used the same basis. Since they
both make random choices on average 1/2 of the transmission have to
be discarded. If no eavesdropper is present Alice and Bob will now share
a random string of α, β, γ and δ’s, where the various letters are taken
to be the subscript of the states, i.e. |ψα 〉 and | φα 〉 are identified as
the letter ’α’, etc. Thus, if Bob initially made n detections, he ends up
with n/2 quarts, which is, in terms of information contents, equivalent
to n bits. This key can now directly be used to encode a secret message
using the One Time Pad. Note that the One Time Pad is not restricted
to bits, but that any alphabet can be used, see e.g.[1].
2.2 Eavesdropping — Intercept/resend
During the public discussion Alice and Bob extract a subset of data
which is compared in public. This discussion leads to an estimate of the
error rate induced by the presence of an eavesdropper. The data revealed
during the discussion is afterwards discarded.
The simplest possible eavesdropping strategy is the intercept/resend
strategy, in which Eve (the eavesdropper) intercepts the transmissions
from Alice to Bob, performs a measurement and, according to the out-
come of her measurement, she prepares a new state and sends it on to
Bob. In the following only the cases where Alice and Bob use the same
basis are considered, since the ones where they use different bases are
discarded during the public discussion.
Suppose Alice sends the state |ψα 〉. If Eve performs her measurement
in the ψ−basis she will find the state |ψα 〉 and she will prepare a new
|ψα 〉 state and send it to Bob. Hence Eve introduces no errors and Bob
finds the correct state. If instead Eve measures in the φ−basis, she will
with equal probability, 1/4, find one of the four different φ−states and
pass it on to Bob. For any of the φ−states Bob will only find the correct
state, |ψα 〉, with probability 1/4 — which means that with probability
3/4 he will get the wrong state, hence an error.
For the following discussions it is convenient to introduce a more
formal measure of information. The relevant information measure here
is Shannon Information [13] which by tradition is measured in terms of
bits. The Shannon information is for qubits bounded between 0 and
1 bit, since each qubit can carry one bit of information. Whereas for
the qu-quarts the Shannon information is bounded between 0 and 2
bits since each qu-quart can carry two bits of information. To obtain
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0 bits of course means obtaining no information, and 1 bit or 2 bits,
respectively, means having full information. The general form of the
Shannon information is
IS =
{
1 +H(p1, .., pn) for qubits
2 +H(p1, .., pn) for qu− quarts
(3)
where H(p1, .., pn) is the entropy function defined as H(p1, .., pn) =
p1 log2 p1 + · · · + pn log2 pn, and p1, ..pn is the probability distribution
of the possible outcomes 1...n.
Above it was argued that the eavesdropper learns correctly half of
the transmissions when using the intercept/resend strategy. The formal
definition of Shannon information leads for the qu-quart case to
I4S =
1
2
[ 2 + 1 log2 1 + 0 log2 0 + 0 log2 0 + 0 log2 0 ]+
1
2
[ 2 + 1
4
log
2
1
4
+ 1
4
log
2
1
4
+ 1
4
log
2
1
4
+ 1
4
log
2
1
4
]
= 1
(4)
as expected, since half of the times Eve learns 2 bits and half of the times
she learns 0 bits, leading to an average of 1 bit — half of the transferred
information.
Calculating Eve’s amount of Shannon information for the qubit case
leads to
I2S =
1
2
[ 1 + 1 log
2
1 + 0 log
2
0 ] + 1
2
[ 1 + 1
2
log
2
1
2
+ 1
2
log
2
1
2
]
= 1
2
(5)
This means that also in the qubit case the eavesdropper learns on aver-
age only half of the transfered information, however, she will introduce a
smaller error rate of only one out of four transmissions [3]. To conclude,
the eavesdropper gains the same fraction of information whether using
qu-quarts or qubits, however the qu-quarts do hold an advantage for Al-
ice and Bob, since the eavesdropper introduces a higher error rate — 3/8
compared to 1/4 — in order to obtain the same amount of information
[14]. From now on, we will refer to the quantum error rate in the general
case as quantum transmission error rate QTER.
2.2.1 The intermediate basis
As in the qubit case Eve may also chose to perform her measurement
in what is known as the intermediate basis, instead of using the same
bases as Alice and Bob [3]. Eavesdropping in the intermediate basis
is the simplest example of an eavesdropping strategy which gives the
eavesdropper probabilistic information.
In the extended BB84 protocol the intermediate θ− basis is defined
with the following requirements
|〈 θi |ψi 〉| = |〈 θi | φi 〉| = max value
|〈 θi |ψj 〉| = |〈 θi | φj 〉| = min value, for all i 6= j
(6)
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The two vectors |ψi 〉 and | φi 〉 define a plane. The vector which gives
the same maximum overlap, is the one with the same minimum distance
to both of them, which is
| θi 〉 = N (|ψi 〉+ | φi 〉) (7)
where N is the normalization constant. This argument leads to the
following intermediate basis
| θα 〉 =
1
2
√
3
( 3|ψα 〉+ |ψβ 〉+ |ψγ 〉+ |ψδ 〉 )
| θβ 〉 =
1
2
√
3
( |ψα 〉 − 3|ψβ 〉+ |ψγ 〉 − |ψδ 〉 )
| θγ 〉 =
1
2
√
3
( |ψα 〉 − |ψβ 〉 − 3|ψγ 〉+ |ψδ 〉 )
| θδ 〉 =
1
2
√
3
( |ψα 〉+ |ψβ 〉 − |ψγ 〉 − 3|ψδ 〉 )
(8)
which satisfy |〈 θi | θj 〉| = δij and which has the following overlaps
|〈 θi |ψi 〉| = |〈 θi | φi 〉| =
3
2
√
3
|〈 θi |ψj 〉| = |〈 θi | φj 〉| =
1
2
√
3
(9)
Assume that Alice sends the state |ψα 〉 and Eve measures in the
intermediate basis, i.e. the θ−basis, then she will find the following out-
comes with the corresponding probabilities: P (θα) = 3/4 and P (θβ) =
P (θγ) = P (θδ) = 1/12. These probabilities give Eve the following Shan-
non information
I4S = ( 2 +
3
4
log
2
3
4
+ 3
1
12
log
2
1
12
) ≈ 0.792 (10)
and she will give rise to the following error rate: with probability 3/4
Eve will send to Bob the state | θα 〉 and with probability 1/12 she will
send him | θβ 〉, | θγ 〉 or | θδ 〉. Which gives Bob the following probability
of finding the correct state (remember that Alice sent |ψα 〉, and it is
assumed that Bob measures in the ψ−basis) 3
4
3
4
+ 3( 1
12
1
12
) = 5
8
. Which
means that even if Eve measures in the intermediate basis she will in-
troduce the same error rate, namely 3/8.
Comparing this strategy on the qu-quarts with the equivalent strategy
on qubits; In the qubit case Eve has probability P (s) = 2−
√
2
4
≈ 0.146
for successfully identifying the state, leading to an amount of Shannon
information of
I2S = ( 1 + (
2−
√
2
4
) log
2
( 2−
√
2
4
) + (1− 2−
√
2
4
) log
2
(1− 2−
√
2
4
) ) ≈ 0.399 (11)
and an QBER of 1/4. To compare the information gained by the eaves-
dropper in the two cases, we have to consider how much information
she has on the whole string. Suppose that Alice has sent n qu-quarts,
then Eve has 0.792n bits of information on the whole string. In order to
transmit the same amount of information to Bob using qubits, Alice has
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to send 2n qubits since each qubit carries half the amount of informa-
tion of a qu-quart. This means that in the qubit case Eve would obtain
2n × 0.399 = 0.798n bits of information. Again this shows that in the
case of a larger alphabet the eavesdropper will introduce a higher error
rate — the same as in the case treated before (2.2)—- in order to get a
comparable amount of information. The issue of optimal eavesdropping
on the higher alphabet will be discussed in a forthcoming paper [15].
2.3 Mapping onto a two-dimensional key
Classically a larger alphabet like the one used here, may simply be viewed
as an encoding of bits, for example α = 00, β = 01, γ = 10 and δ = 11.
Alice and Bob can also in this case chose to view the higher alphabet as a
simple encoding of bits. However, the following example shows that they
have to be careful about when they perform the translation. Suppose
that the eavesdropper has used the intermediate basis1, then she will
have obtained each quart correctly with probability 3/4. This means
that on average Eve will have 3 out of 4 quarts correctly — however she
does not know which ones she has correctly and which ones are wrong.
Now suppose that Alice has sent the following string of α, β, γ and δ:
Alice : α δ β α γ δ δ β γ α β δ...
but that Eve has the string
Eve : α δ γ α γ β δ β γ α α δ...
It is easily seen that 3 out of 12 are wrong in Eve’s string or that she
has 9/12 = 3/4 correct.
Assume now that Alice and Bob want to map the 4-dimensional key
onto a binary one. Using the above given example, Alice’s new string
reads
Alice : 00 11 01 00 10 11 11 01 10 00 01 11...
Doing the same with her sequence of quarts, Eve ends up with
Eve : 00 11 10 00 10 01 11 01 10 00 00 11...
Notice that here Eve has 4/24 = 1/6 bits wrong or 5 out of 6 bits correct.
This is due to the fact that the errors occurring in Eve’s string are no
longer independent, but depend on each other in the respective blocks.
Beyond, the processes of error correction and privacy amplification do
not apply to this case. This means that Alice and Bob have to perform
1The same can not be illustrated considering the eavesdropping strategy where Eve use the
same basis as Alice and Bob, since in that case she has either full information about the quart sent
by Alice or no information at all.
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this process in the higher alphabet, and only perform the translation to
bits at the very end when the eavesdropper has no information on the
string shared between them.
It is important to realize that Alice and Bob should not even dis-
cuss how the translation should be done until after error correction and
privacy amplification, since this information may give an advantage to
the eavesdropper. Assume that Alice and Bob before starting the trans-
missions of qu-quarts have decided for the bit-encoding which is given
above. In designing the optimal eavesdropping strategy, Eve may use
this knowledge to give different weight to the various states. Suppose,
for example, Alice sends an α. Eve will with the highest possible prob-
ability try to identify that Alice sent an α, since in that case she has
learned both bits correctly. Failing to make the correct identification,
and instead obtaining β or γ will however still give her one bit correct,
whereas finding δ gives her only errors. As a consequence Eve will give
more weight to β and γ, than to δ. However, this is very different from
eavesdropping on the higher alphabet, where obtaining α is correct, but
any other letter β, γ or δ is equally wrong.
3 Experimental realization
In the following, the given states are given physical meaning and a pos-
sible experimental realization for a four-letter alphabet is presented. It
is important to notice that generalization to arbitrarily large alphabets
is in principle possible.
Alice is in possession of an apparatus (see fig.1) that allows her to
route an incoming photon (or faint laser pulse) emitted at time t0 to one
of four different delay lines. This task can be accomplished by using an
optical switch. Using another switch, the light traveling via the chosen
delay line is then injected (at times tα,..,tδ) into the output port of the
device. This apparatus thus allows Alice to create single photons in four
different time slots which we identify with the states |ψα 〉, · · · , |ψδ 〉. To
distinguish the four states of the ψ- or time-basis, it suffices to measure
the arrival time of the photons with respect to t0. Bobs analyzer thus
simply consists of a photon detector and a fast clock.
In order to create one of the four states belonging to the φ- or energy-
basis, Alice has to prepare a coherent superposition of the four emission
times with appropriate phase differences. Hence, the first switch in the
preparation device has to be replaced by a symmetric 1 x 4 optical cou-
pler. Using the coupler depicted in Figure 2 [10] and phases αA, · · · , δA,
it is not difficult to show that it is possible to create the desired states
| φα 〉, · · · , | φδ 〉. For instance, choosing αA= 0, βA=pi/2, γA= 0 and
δA= −pi/2 leads (neglecting an unimportant overall phase) to creation
of | φα 〉 [16]. In order to distinguish the four states of the energy basis,
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Bob has to have a device that coherently recombines the pulses arriv-
ing at times tα, · · · , tδ and then makes them interfere in such a way,
that each state leads to completely constructive interference in specific
output port, hence to a detection by a different detector. The device
thus consists of an optical switch that routes the pulse arriving first to
a long delay line, the pulse arriving second to a shorter one etc. in a
way, that the delay difference introduced by Alice will be exactly com-
pensated. Using the already mentioned 4 x 4 coupler and phase settings
αB = 0, βB = −pi/2, γB = 0 and δB = pi/2, it is straightforward to show
that each state indeed leads to detection in a different detector (i.e., | φα 〉
leads to detection in Dα etc).
4 Discussion and experimental extensions
As stated in the introduction, one of the motivations for considering
higher dimensional systems for QKD is the increase of information per
photon. This leads after error correction and privacy amplification of
the high-dimensional (more-then-two-dimensional) key to a larger binary
key. Beyond, the important point of our proposal is that the mentioned
speedup goes along with an increasing quantum transmission error rate
introduced by eavesdropping. Unfortunately, this advantage of easier
detection of an unlegitimized third person is somewhat hidden by a
higher QTER introduced by Alice and Bob themselves. That is, the
larger number of simultaneously active (and noisy) detectors engenders
a higher probability that one detector sees a dark count while a photon is
expected to arrive. However, we believe that as long as those errors are
small, QKD using higher alphabets could still be advantageous compared
to two-level systems.
Attention should be drawn to several interesting extensions of this
proposal. First of all, similar to QKD schemes based on two-level sys-
tems, it is possible to find a ”plug&play” system [17] using time multi-
plexed interferometry to realize systems of higher dimensions as well, the
advantage being that there is no need to equalize the path differences of
different interferometers. Second, our proposal can easily be extended
to photon correlation experiments as well (for proposals in the domain
of fundamental physics, see i.e. [10, 11]). To give an example, higher
dimensional secret sharing [18] could be realized in the following way.
One could pump a nonlinear crystal with a laser pulse, having traveled
via one out of n delay lines, or a coherent superposition of n delay lines,
respectively. Similar to the here treated case, the created photon pair
would then be described either in a time, or an energy basis. After hav-
ing separated the two photons, each one is then analyzed in one of the
two bases (in this context, see [19, 20]).
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5 Conclusion
We proposed to enlarge the dimensions of quantum systems for quan-
tum key distribution and analyzed a protocol based on four orthogonal
states in two different bases in terms of information transfer and intro-
duced errors by an intercept/resend eavesdropping attack. Since every
particle now carries more information, we find an increased flux of infor-
mation which can be turned into an increased binary key creation rate.
Beyond, the quantum transmission error rate introduced by an eaves-
dropper for a given amount of acquired information is much higher then
in the qubit case. Furthermore we proposed an experimental realization
using an interferometric setup. Even if the quantum transmission error
rate introduced by the noise of the detectors is higher than in the qubit
case, the new protocol will still be advantageous compared to two-level
systems as long as these errors are small.
Besides these more practical considerations, the most important point
of our proposal is that, in opposition to its classical counterpart, quantum
information theory, at least quantum key distribution, changes when
passing from two dimensional to higher dimensional systems. We thus
believe that it might be interesting to consider other applications from
this the point of view as well.
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Figure 1: Schematical setup for four-letter quantum key distribution. See text for
detailed description.
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
O
1
O
2
O
3
O
4
I
4
I
1
O
1
O
2
I
2
I
3
O
3
O
4
Figure 2: Bulk- and fiber optical realization of a symmetric 4x4 coupler.
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